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INTRODUCTION
In his award-winning book, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in
American History,1 John Fabian Witt examines how the Lincoln
administration charted a novel legal course by adopting codified laws of
war for the Union armies—“Instruction for the Government of Armies of
the United States in the Field” or “Lincoln’s Code”—which shaped the
meaning of emancipation, the Union’s broader military policy, and
international law thereafter—i.e., the Geneva Convention. The magnitude
of violence during Civil War campaigns and the dilemma of how the war
would affect the institution of slavery had undercut the relevance of mid19th century laws of war orthodoxy—as used herein, “laws of war
orthodoxy” or “orthodox laws of war”—for the Lincoln administration,
prompting a reevaluation of those laws ending with Lincoln’s Code. The
premium placed by orthodox laws of war on bright-line rules to govern
Copyright 2019, by WINTHROP RUTHERFURD.
* J.D., 2015, University of Virginia School of Law; M.A. (History), 2015,
University of Virginia; B.A., 2011, University of Virginia. To my parents for
fostering my passion in Civil War studies and to Professor Gary Gallagher at the
University of Virginia for his guidance over the years.
1. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2012).
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battles between professional soldiers—as used herein, “conventional
combat”—seemed ill-suited to the Civil War by the end of its second year.
No comprehensive body of regulatory or statutory laws of war existed
prior to Lincoln’s Code. Laws of war in 1861 meant the general consensus
regarding the proper conduct of warfare—and corresponding punishments
for infractions thereof—that precepts from domestic and international
scholars formed, dominated by laws of war orthodoxy, and a collection of
military regulations dominated.2 Lincoln’s Code generally marked a
formulistic point of departure from laws of war before that time as a
government document purporting to comprehensively codify laws of war.
Lincoln’s Code departed from laws of war orthodoxy substantively,
notably in the Code’s development of the concept of military necessity—
2. This Article refers to prevailing 18th and early 19th century laws of war
theory, as expounded by Witt, as “orthodoxy” or “orthodox laws of war.” “The
laws of war” refers to the approximate consensus at any given time as to the
precepts of government adopted rules or regulations governing military conduct,
shaping what constitutes acceptable or legal conduct distinct from conduct
punishable as in violation by the laws of war or by civil authorities. By the end of
the Civil War, orthodoxy no longer predominated the laws of war. Witt presents
Emer de Vattel as the father of this movement as Vattel’s “The Law of Nations”
crystallized the “limited war” spirit of the age. The “limited war” spirit
represented a belief that enlightenment humanitarianism should constrain wars to
diminish the ravages of war. Pursuant to the orthodox paradigm, war between
civilized nations would not devolve into destructive struggles that wreaked havoc
on nations’ populations and prosperity if nations opted to abide by morally neutral
black letter rules. Reflecting and shaping military customs of the day, the rules
Vattel and likeminded jurists propagated proscribed violence against civilians,
killing outside the field of battle—i.e., by assassination, poisoning, using false
uniforms to trick enemy soldiers—and violence against a surrendered enemy,
collectively intended to result in “moderate” and “gentle” wars whereby most
were exempt from the wars’ rigors. Treatises such as those Benjamin Franklin
supported to abolish the rights of plunder and pillage, sought to effectuate laws of
war orthodoxy ideals in America. Violence was the province of professional
uniformed soldiers under a sovereign nation state’s direction engaged in set-piece
battles in pursuit of limited national goals. Combatants without uniforms—
thereby not representing a state—or participating in combat outside set-piece
battles outside the guidance of a sovereign’s authorized officers, called
“conventional combat,” fell outside the convention of Vattellian laws of war so
were not party to the benefits such laws of war afforded soldiers to limit war’s
brutality. Those participating in unconventional conflict threatened the civilized
limited war paradigm ordered by clearly and easily applied bright line rules that
reduced carnage and ensured the safety of mankind, and because they threatened
the rules meant to preserve humanitarian order did not enjoy the privileges of its
protection, such as prisoner exchange. Id. at 16–23, 44–45, 94.
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the justified use of methods outside those accepted by, or in violation of,
laws of war only as far as necessary to rationally advance a nation’s war
goals, and sooner end conflict. In Witt’s account, the Confederacy did not
engage to adapt laws of war to the Civil War’s contingency, as he
concludes, they “had no need to produce a new chapter in the laws of war,”
because “their aim was not to transform those laws but to embrace them
in the form they had taken since the earliest days of the republic.”3
Witt mischaracterizes the Confederate leadership as champions of
laws of war orthodoxy. The history of the Partisan Ranger Act (“PRA”),
whereby the Confederacy commissioned combatants for unconventional
war, illustrates the Confederate leadership’s willingness to adapt laws of
war orthodoxy to address the Civil War’s contingencies. Through the
PRA, Confederate leaders effectively sought to broaden the scope of
legally acceptable combat to accommodate the evolving reality of
unconventional violence in the form of widespread guerrilla activity.
Witt’s narrative, and one’s understanding of the laws of war after the 19th
century, are more comprehensive if one addresses how the Confederacy’s
leadership experimented with similar legal forms as its Northern
counterparts. Specifically, military necessity provided the motivation for
the PRA’s enactment and repeal.
The PRA was meant to channel unrestrained and unconventional
violence from the amorphous unproductive form outside the purview of
government control into a form that, Confederate leaders hoped, would
rationally advance the Confederacy’s war goals. The PRA’s proponents
endeavored to navigate carefully between the Scylla of promoting
widespread unconventional violence and Charybdis of doing nothing,
letting guerrilla activity proliferate unrestrained. When partisan rangers’
military failures no longer rationally advanced the Confederacy’s war
goals, the Confederate leadership reverted to the prevailing orthodox
position that unconventional combatants were not soldiers under the laws
of war. Through the PRA, Confederate leaders put a central theme of
Lincoln’s Code into practice. Parallels exist between how the Northern
and Southern leaderships experimented with promoting new forms of
military activity. These experiments reciprocally interacted in an ongoing
legal discussion throughout the war.
The reaction to the PRA informed a variety of Union policies,
affecting the treatment of Southern civilians and discussions on
Confederate sovereignty and collectively engendering legal uncertainty
amongst Union military leaders that resulted in the promulgation of
Lincoln’s Code. Partisan rangers’ status problematized Union policies that
3. Id. at 223.
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treated all unconventional combatants as guerillas and the scope of
military jurisdiction in occupied states. Officers were forced to decide
whether to treat partisan rangers as soldiers or as criminals and to
determine the appropriate jurisdiction if partisan rangers were criminals.
These decisions included the grander question of whether Union
commanders should accept the Confederacy’s interpretation of the laws of
war, a departure from the prevailing understanding of laws of war
orthodoxy. The presumption that Union commanders would recognize
partisan rangers as soldiers under the laws of war was effectively the
Confederacy’s claim of sovereign authority to revise laws of war and a
demand that Union leaders recognize that sovereign prerogative. The
officers’ response to this dilemma varied greatly; many maintained the
right, pointing to the prevailing orthodox position on unconventional
combatants, to bring partisan rangers before a military commission to be
tried and executed as guerrillas or “bushwhackers.”
To combat what Union commanders understood to be a breach in the
laws of war by supporting unconventional combatants, such commanders
justified an increasingly destructive policy of retaliation against civilians
and propelled the Civil War into a more destructive and desperate conflict.
Uncertainty over how to treat captured unconventional combatants and
combat them in the field prompted the Lincoln administration to engage
Francis Lieber, a noted legal scholar, to provide guidance. Lieber
responded with a treatise on unconventional combatants, winning him
gravitas with the administration; this appreciation translated into Lieber’s
appointment as the principal drafter of Lincoln’s Code. Both the treatise
and Lincoln’s Code entitled partisan rangers to the same privileges as
conventional soldiers under the laws of war and rebuked the Union
officers’ prevailing orthodox position.
Witt is not alone in passing over the PRA’s import. Although a
growing body of scholarship centers on unconventional or guerrilla
warfare in the Civil War, relatively little scholarship exists on the PRA
and its legal implications. Coverage of unconventional warfare in the Civil
War scholarship shares certain core commonalities. Scholars place great
emphasis on how experience with unconventional combatants affected
development of official attitudes on military strategy—i.e., whether to
hold local civilians accountable by military authorities—and the effect of
the nearly incomprehensible iterations of unconventional military activity
on civilians and communities without attention to the PRA.4
4. Mark Grimsley and Mark Neely explore the Union’s evolving counterguerrilla strategies and policies regarding civilians, but neither explores the origins
of, or Confederate perspective on, partisan ranger action. See MARK GRIMSLEY, THE
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HARD HAND OF WAR: UNION MILITARY POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN CIVILIANS
1861–1865 (1995); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE CIVIL WAR AND THE LIMITS OF
DESTRUCTION (2007). Grimsley focuses on the interplay of official Union policy,
combat experience, and informal attitudes of soldiers to explain why Union armies
adopted a “hard war” to eliminate civilian support for the Confederacy. Grimsley
defines “hard war” as actions against Southern civilians and property expressly to
demoralize Southern civilians and the allocation of substantial military resources to
accomplish the task. See GRIMSLEY, supra. Although acknowledging that guerrillas
influenced Union policy, neither Grimsley nor Neely would go as far as Clay
Mountcastle in asserting the impact of guerrillas. See CLAY MOUNTCASTLE,
PUNITIVE WAR: CONFEDERATE GUERRILLAS AND UNION REPRISALS (2009).
Mountcastle posits that the Union’s punitive strategy against the South during the
war’s latter half must be understood as a response to guerrilla activity. To
supplement quantitative analysis, Mountcastle addresses the psychological effects
of guerrillas on Union soldiers and the gradual, nonlinear development of attitudes
that prompted a punitive war. See id. Kenneth Noe investigates the deeply
embedded cultural animosities between Union soldiers and pro-Confederate
guerrillas that helped fuel the cycle of violence; Union soldiers deemed the local
populace in Appalachia their cultural and social inferiors. Kenneth W. Noe,
Exterminating Savages: The Union Army and Mountain Guerrillas in Southern
West Virginia, 1861–1862, in THE CIVIL WAR IN APPALACHIA: COLLECTED ESSAYS
104 (Kenneth W. Noe & Shannon Wilson eds., 1st ed. 1997). Other historians
employ different analytical lenses to address the Confederate and civilian
perspectives. Michael Fellman provides insight into the nature of guerrilla war in
Missouri, particularly the reciprocal actions and policies of Confederate and Union
leaders to convey the complex breadth of unconventional war’s violence and the
blurred lines between civilians and combatants, but he treats Missouri as a region
almost distinct from the rest of the Confederacy. See MICHAEL FELLMAN, INSIDE
WAR: THE GUERRILLA CONFLICT IN MISSOURI DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
(1989). Stephen V. Ash assesses Confederate civilian responses to Union invasions
and posits that guerrilla warfare should be understood as an extension of the
community and southern cultural traditions. See STEPHEN V. ASH, WHEN THE
YANKEES CAME: CONFLICT AND CHAOS IN THE OCCUPIED SOUTH, 1861–1865
(1995). Kenneth Noe also examined the socio-economic characteristics of
guerrillas, finding that the guerrillas were often older and more well-established
than others had generally believed. Kenneth W. Noe, Who Were the Bushwackers?:
Age, Class, Kin, and Western Virginia’s Confederate Guerrillas, 1861–1862, in 49
CIVIL WAR HISTORY no. 1 at 5, 15 (2003). Robert Mackey and Daniel Sutherland
stand out regarding the Partisan Ranger Act. Mackey argues that Confederate
leaders embraced unconventional warfare, such as the partisan ranger service, to
complement the conventional war. Dominant military theory and experiences in the
Mexican-American War inclined Confederates to view unconventional war as an
effective military policy. See ROBERT RUSSELL MACKEY, THE UNCIVIL WAR:
IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE UPPER SOUTH, 1861–1865 (2004). The
unconventional war effort ultimately failed because of the Union’s ability to adapt
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This Article departs from existing scholarship by examining the PRA
as a novel expression of competing legal forces in the history of America’s
laws of war that Witt in Lincoln’s Code identified, but did not explore.
This Article begins with an overview of unconventional combatants
standing under orthodox laws of war prior to the Civil War to address
antecedents for both positive and negative perspectives of the PRA.
Additionally, this Article addresses how the rapid expansion of
unconventional combat in the Civil War induced Virginia to raise partisan
ranger units, previewing the motivations for, and limitations of, the PRA.
Part II covers the PRA’s passage and how the boundaries of acceptable
military behavior constrained expectations of partisan rangers, but how
they were also able to push those boundaries. Part III examines how Union
perspectives on and responses to the PRA led Union leaders to examine
laws of war orthodoxy, resulting in Francis Lieber’s engagement and
Lincoln’s Code. This Article concludes with an analysis of why
Confederate leaders soured on the use of partisan rangers, repealed the
PRA, and reverted to the prevailing orthodox position on unconventional
combatants.
I. ORIGINS OF THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT
Conflicting factors and historical trends created an array of attitudes
about unconventional combatants in mid-19th century America.5 At West
Point and other military academies, students studied Napoleon’s
campaigns and were educated in the proper conduct of war by reading the
European and American standard bearers of laws of war orthodoxy,
including: Antoine-Henri Jomini in The Art of War; Dennis Hart Mahan
in Outpost; and Henry W. Halleck in Elements of Military Art and
Science.6 Such works were produced to guide the conduct and strategy of
large conventional armies that a centralized government organized and
and implement successful counter-strategies, he argues. Sutherland names factors
such as the reverence for the American Revolution’s guerrillas and southerner’s
ties to the locality to explain a widespread preference among border citizens for
guerrilla over conventional service. See DANIEL E. SUTHERLAND, A SAVAGE
CONFLICT: THE DECISIVE ROLE OF GUERRILLAS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
(2009).
5. See MOUNTCASTLE, supra note 4, at 8–20 (for a survey of the antebellum
experience with unconventional war).
6. ANTONINE-HENRI HOMINI, THE ART OF WAR (1838); DENNIS HART
MANHAN, ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ADVANCED GUARD, OUTPOSTS, AND
DETACHMENT SERVICE OF TROOPS (1847); HENRY W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF
MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE (1846).
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outfitted. As a result, normative expectations of future Civil War leaders
were shaped by the orthodoxy’s preoccupation with conventional
campaigns between 18th and early 19th century western European nation
states rather than a state of war wherein individuals could act outside of
government authorization and directives. In the orthodox paradigm, the
protections the laws of war afforded to combatants only extended to
individuals operating as an arm of the state, which uniforms and military
bureaucracy denotes.
Combat that government-commissioned officers did not direct was
outside the sovereign’s control, incidentally eroding a sovereign’s
prerogative to direct violence to accomplish state goals. Such warfare,
therefore, fell outside the prevailing understanding of the boundaries of
18th and early 19th century orthodox laws of war because unconventional
combat raised the specter of individuals’ unchecked emotion and chaos.
Because unconventional warfare resembled criminality, adherents of
orthodoxy generally viewed it as illegal; the state could execute
unconventional combatants as bandits or murderers under military or civil
law.7
Unconventional combat was not, however, understood to be wholly
outside the boundaries of European laws of war orthodoxy, and even less
so from the American variant thereof.8 Various European legal scholars
7. Vattel, for example, forbade citizens from waging unconventional
warfare outright. HENRY HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE,
OR, COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN STRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF
BATTLES, ETC. 37 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1860); STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 163 (2005); EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 399–400
(London, G.G. & J. Robinson eds., rev. ed. 1797).
8. The American variant diverged from the European in the sacrosanct
treatment of property rights—i.e., by Jurist James Kent, roughly the analogue of
Vattel in this space—and experience with non-white combatants. The latter
profoundly influenced attitudes about partisan rangers. Experience during the
Revolution with Native Americans and Mexican guerrillas who fought outside the
scope of European laws of war orthodoxy forced American military minds to
grapple with the practicality of European laws of war orthodoxy when combating
those who did not fight by European convention. This experience set a
contradictory precedent by which American military men understood the utility
of unconventional tactics, which Americans employed with effect against the
British during the Revolution and Native Americans, but also instituted a novel
and harsh response to punish unconventional combatants, such as the institution
of commissions to treat punish Mexican guerrillas as criminals, which Witt points
out, gave life to the idea of a war crime. WITT, supra note 1, at 71, 90, 107, 122–
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developed regimes for unconventional combatants. Two notable Prussian
officers produced texts—Johann von Ewald’s Treatise on the Small War
and Andreas Emmerich’s The Partisan in War or the Use of a Corps of
Light Troops for an Army9—covering unconventional war and the utility
of “partisans” after serving in the British army during the American
Revolution. In conventional 18th and early 19th century armies, light
cavalry or infantry sometimes operated in a gray zone between
conventional and unconventional combat by surprising enemy supply
posts in quick lightning attacks or scouting behind enemy lines; such
conduct was not considered a breach of laws of war orthodoxy.
Examples of unconventional combat are prominently in American
military heritage. Even if reared on European laws of war orthodoxy, the
nature of pre-Civil War military conflicts—particularly conflicts with
Native Americans—forced familiarity with and respect for the efficacy of
unconventional war amongst many American military men. Experience
reinforced the prevailing orthodox position’s antipathy for unconventional
combat for some but convinced others of its efficacy.10 Exploits of
24, 130. Witt briefly acknowledges the PRA represented a novel amendment to
laws of war orthodoxy, writing:
[T]he official Confederate embrace of partisan rangers in the spring of
1862 revealed a potential flaw in the orthodox Enlightenment approach.
For what the Confederacy had shown in the Partisan Ranger Act was that
a belligerent could very easily extend commissions to irregulars and thus
give them the status of soldiers deserving prisoner of war treatment.
Id. at 192.
9. JOHANN VON EWALD, TREATISE ON THE SMALL WAR (1790); ANDREAS
EMMERICH, THE PARTISAN IN WAR OR THE USE OF A CORPS OF LIGHT TROOPS FOR
AN ARMY (1789).
10. The U.S. Army developed an array of procedures to battle unconventional
combat of Native Americans. Early colonists abandoned European style warfare
to adopt the combat methods of their Native American foes; both sides engaged
in surprise raids, attacks on settlements, and destruction of civilian supplies.
Frustrated with the guerrilla tactics the Seminoles employed during the Second
Seminole War (1835–1842), U.S. commanders, specifically General William J.
Worth, resorted to destroying entire villages. Only once did the Seminoles face
U.S. troops in a conventional battle that ended in a disastrous defeat at the battle
of Okeechobee. U.S. armies under Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott
encountered stiff guerrilla resistance during the Mexican-American War (1846–
1848). Troops developed strategies to combat the Mexicans. Several future Civil
War commanders who had served in the U.S. Army understood the threat
guerrillas posed and were versed in effective counter-guerrilla methods. Only later
in the Civil War, however, did Union officers adopt the tactics deemed
appropriate to employ only against the Native American and Mexican enemies to
combat southerners. MOUNTCASTLE, supra note 4, at 15.
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unconventional units—such as Francis “the Swamp Fox” Marion’s during
the Revolution—incepted into the American military conscious,
particularly in the South. A romantic view of unconventional combatants
normalized unconventional combat in the American South.11
Precedent and nostalgia shaped Confederate leaders’ understanding of
the laws of war and made them receptive to employing unconventional
units. Laws of war—i.e., light cavalry—and practical—i.e., Marion’s
troops—precedents substantiated an argument that because partisan
rangers were government-authorized, organized, and disciplined, partisan
rangers were essentially fungible with conventional soldiers. Since
partisan rangers functioned in most respects like conventional soldiers, the
laws of war should treat partisan rangers as conventional soldiers.12
Francis Lieber agreed that partisan rangers shared the same rights as
conventional soldiers, but this was the minority position amongst those
raised on laws of war orthodoxy, outside the boundaries of the prevailing
orthodox understanding of the laws of war. By and large, both Union and
Confederate leaders in early 1861 envisioned the Civil War would unfold
neatly within the boundaries established for conventional combat. Early
strategies, therefore, anticipated a short war exclusively conventional
armies fought on a small scale. The scope and intensity of the

11. Historian Daniel Sutherland notes, “rebels had a slate of real and fictional
heroes to document their selective version of the past,” notably popularized by the
South’s foremost novelist, William Gilmore Simms, who published a biography
of Francis Marion and historical romances celebrating the South’s Revolutionary
partisans. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 10. The Revolution’s examples
influenced future partisan leaders, to which John Mosby attested in his memoirs:
“I borrowed a copy of the ‘Life of Marion’, which was the first book I read, except
as a task at school. I remember how I shouted when I read aloud in the nursery of
the way the great partisan hid in the swamp and outwitted the British.” JOHN S.
MOSBY, THE MEMOIRS OF COLONEL JOHN S. MOSBY 4 (Charles Wells Russell ed.,
1917). In his romantic novel, The Partisan Leader (1836), Nathaniel Beverley
Tucker envisioned a war between the North and South and chose a Virginia
partisan commander as his protagonist. At one point a Virginian points out, “the
dispositions of the people, and the strong fastnesses of the country, will make it a
secure retreat to a partisan corps.” NATHANIEL BEVERLY TUCKER, THE PARTISAN
LEADER 141 (Rev. Thos. A. Ware, ed., Richmond, West & Johnston 1862),
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL7000928M/The_partisan_leader [https://perma.c
c/WEX8-E7Y3].
12. IAN FREDERICK WILLIAM BECKETT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GUERRILLA
WARFARE 4 (ABC-CLIO 1999).
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unconventional conflict breaking out along the border-states took leaders
in both the North and South by surprise.13
The escalating unconventional violence in western Virginia motivated
Virginia’s legislature to enact the “Virginia Ranger Act.” The Act, on
March 27, 1862, authorized the governor, John Letcher, to raise units of
“rangers” referred to hereinafter as “state rangers.” After Union troops
drove Confederate forces out of western Virginia in a series of battles in
the summer of 1861, pro-Confederate unconventional combatants became
active throughout the region. Employing the raids, ambushes, and terror
tactics associated with “Indian” fighting and unconventional predecessors
from the Revolution, such combatants formed units, with names such as
the “Moccasin Rangers,” to clash with pro-Union unconventional
combatant bands, with names such as the “Snake Hunters,” civilians, and
Union soldiers.14
The resulting non-state-directed guerilla violence troubled Virginia’s
legislature for two main reasons. First, such violence was often directed
against civilians incumbent on the government to protect. Second,
Virginia needed men in conventional service to effectively counter Union
conventional forces. Necessity is the mother of invention, and the Virginia
Ranger Act was intended to remedy this situation. The Virginia Ranger
Act instructed state rangers to offer “the greatest protection to our loyal
citizens” but harass occupying Union forces by “cutting off their
marauding and foraging parties.”15 Strategic use of unconventional
combatants could benefit numerically inferior conventional Confederate
forces by forcing Union leaders to divert resources from campaigns
against the Confederate capital in Richmond.16
13. FELLMAN, supra note 4, at 23. Unconventional combatants did not lend
themselves to easy categorization. Unionist guerrillas terrorized rebel neighbors;
rebel guerrillas fought U.S. soldiers; unaffiliated bands used the war as a pretext
to plunder—oftentimes, the cover of war permitted antebellum adversaries to
continue family feuds or revisit class antagonisms. The variety of guerrilla
organizations and extent of the terror they caused defies characterization or
quantification. Id. at 23–29.
14. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 31.
15. RANDALL OSBORNE & JEFFREY WEAVER, THE VIRGINIA STATE RANGERS
AND STATE LINE 4–5 (1994); An Act to authorize the organization of ten or more
Companies of Rangers, ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 1861–62 (1862) [hereinafter VSRA], https://babel
.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101073363317;view=1up;seq=57 [https://perma.c
c/E6NC-8AT3].
16. Mosby stated that “the military value of the species of warfare I have
waged is not measured by the number of prisoners and material of war captured
from the enemy, but by the heavy detail it has already compelled him to make.”
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The Virginia Legislature saw unconventional combatants as a
resource to supplement conventional forces and consequently mandated
state rangers to coordinate with conventional troops.17 The Virginia
Ranger Act proscribed recruitment only in areas under Union control,
revealing the Virginia legislators’ intent that state rangers would be a
limited instrument to utilize citizens who could not, or would not, serve in
the conventional Confederate army.18 Recruitment could not interfere with
or impair “the laws providing for the quota of Virginia to the Confederate
Army.”19 Nevertheless, either as state rangers or guerillas, men flocked to
MOSBY, supra note 11, at 262. The threat of guerrilla attacks forced Union forces
to divert resources from campaigning armies, a boon for the numerically inferior
Confederate armies. Letcher complained to a friend about the encroaching Union
armies in Virginia, the ranger service could help keep some Northern troops away
from Richmond. F. N. BONEY, JOHN LETCHER OF VIRGINIA: THE STORY OF
VIRGINIA’S CIVIL WAR GOVERNOR 158 (U. Ala. Press 1966).
17. In the war’s opening months, Turner Ashby demonstrated in Virginia that
a disciplined unconventional unit could operate productively and cooperate with
conventional forces; a cavalry Colonel in the conventional army reporting to the
Secretary of War: “I need not speak of his qualities, for already he is known as
one of the best partisan leaders in the service.” This same cavalry officer offered
a promising vision of employing partisan rangers and utilizing unconventional
warfare to the Secretary of War, reporting that amongst the companies he
assembled, “are some of the very best for the peculiar services of partisan and
border war.” Later he glowingly referred to Captain Ashby: “I need not speak of
his qualities, for already he is known as one of the best partisan leaders in the
service.” 2 U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION
OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I,
953–54 (1880) [hereinafter WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I], https://hdl.handle
.net/2027/mdp.49015002000108 [https://perma.cc/NET9-WTNV]. Ashby and
his “mountain rangers” operated near Harpers Ferry until Major General Joseph
E. Johnston promoted him to lieutenant colonel of the 7th Virginia Cavalry.
During the winter of 1861–1862, Ashby engaged in unconventional activities,
seeking to inflict as much damage as possible on the Chesapeake and Ohio canals,
a major Union supply route. Ashby, however, also served as Major General
Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s de facto cavalry commander during the spring
of 1862 Valley campaign, operating as a conventional cavalry commander; he
covered Jackson’s retreat after the Battle of Kernstown on March 23, 1862.
MILLARD K. BUSHONG, GENERAL TURNER ASHBY & STONEWALL’S VALLEY
CAMPAIGN 34–36, 59, 99, 107 (1980). Ashby exemplifies the dual role that
Confederate commanders later expected partisan rangers to play. Like Ashby,
partisans were to engage in guerrilla style warfare, but operate in conjunction
with, and nominally as, conventional military forces.
18. VSRA, supra note 15, § 3.
19. Id.
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unconventional service to avoid conventional service, to the chagrin of
army officers.20 For Governor Letcher, the state rangers performed a vital
service by protecting his constituents. The Virginia Ranger Act specified
that the government would protect “loyal” citizens, which presumably did
not include “disloyal” unionists. As many “loyal” Virginia men had left
home to join the Confederate Army, Governor Letcher expected local
militia and state rangers to defend loyal women and children against
Northern invaders and disloyal Virginians.21
The manner in which state rangers’ organization and instructions
dovetailed with those of conventional service signals the intention that the
Virginia Ranger Act not drastically depart from orthodoxy. The state
outfitted, paid, and organized the state rangers in the same way as soldiers
in the Confederate army.22 The Virginia Ranger Act prescribed rangers
“conform their operations to the usages of civilized warfare” with the
cryptic condition that “the enemy on their part shall conduct the war
according to the usages of civilized war.”23 Although state rangers
reported directly to Governor Letcher, the Virginia Ranger Act provided
they obey Confederate Army officers to maximize synergies of joint
unconventional and conventional operations; state rangers were to act in
parallel with, but more discreetly than, the conventional Confederate
cavalry.24 The exegesis of the Virginia Ranger Act was, paradoxically, that
in order to remediate the intractable guerrilla conflict’s breach of laws of
war orthodoxy, Confederate leaders sought to harness unconventional
combatants on a heretofore unknown scale. The Virginia Ranger Act
thereby shifted the boundaries of the laws of war away from the prevailing
20. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 92.
21. VSRA, supra note 15, § 3. As Letcher’s biographer, F. N. Boney, notes,
“Bitter over the fate of that section [West Virginia] and fearful for the exposed
Valley, Letcher enthusiastically organized the guerrillas, euphemistically
designated rangers.” On February 5, 1862, Letcher had asked lawmakers to
release militiamen from active service so they could return to normal inactive duty
at home. The legislature complied on February 18, 1862, and ordered all white
males 18–45 years of age to return to their counties in order to enroll in local
militia groups. Letcher had actually begun commissioning ranger officers before
the legislature’s permission on March 18–19, 1862. Letcher recruited men
primarily from West Virginia because, he hoped, they would desist from action
in Virginia to bring the war to West Virginia. BONEY, supra note 16, at 156–58.
22. VRSA, supra note 15, § 1. Ranger companies were structured to mirror
conventional units with one captain, two lieutenants, and four sergeants and
corporals, which the Virginia adjutant general supplied and paid upon receipt of
enrollment list of the soldiers in the company.
23. Id. § 2.
24. Id. § 4.
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orthodox position. Whether this boundary shift was a conscious decision
to adapt laws of war away from orthodoxy or an unconscious perspective
that laws of war orthodoxy treated partisan rangers as conventional
soldiers is unknown. The authors of the Virginia Ranger Act, however,
seemed to expect that Union officials would recognize state rangers as
conventional soldiers under orthodox laws of war. As long as state rangers
comported themselves and were organized similarly to conventional
soldiers, it follows that these parties should be treated similarly under the
laws of war. The Virginia Ranger Act purported to expand the scope of
recognized activity under the orthodox laws of war by legitimizing
unconventional combatants. Union treatment of state rangers and partisan
rangers as guerillas showed that the Virginia Ranger Act tread on legally
controversial grounds.
State rangers were conceptually and legally distinguished from
guerillas because the Virginia Ranger Act obligated state rangers to
operate in formal military units with a clear command structure in
connection with, and by the orders of, conventional units.25 Guerrillas
engaged in combat on their own volition—often using war as an excuse to
settle old scores—without government authority or oversight. In some
ways, state rangers resembled French and Indian or Revolutionary War’s
light infantry companies, which laws of war orthodoxy recognized as
soldiers.26
State rangers did not have the desired military impact. They generally
conducted themselves similarly to guerrillas, neither cooperating effectively
with conventional forces nor behaving as disciplined conventional
soldiers.27 Despondent about the state rangers’ impotence, Confederate

25. Id. §§ 1, 4.
26. MACKEY, supra note 4, at 7. In modern terms, they are akin to special
forces.
27. In 1861 and early 1862, Governor Letcher received letters advocating for
greater oversight of state ranger units. G. W. Berlin of Staunton wrote Letcher:
[T]he counties nearest the mountains, may be visited very soon by
Confederate cavalry and rangers, many of whom enjoy a very inaccurate
knowledge of the people and have sentiments and feelings of the great
many of them and are consequently so prejudiced against the people as
to lead them into not restrained into excesses. . . . and some of these
rangers are in reality nothing but bands of cowardly thieves . . . . All
those unconventional troops should be brought under strict—military
discipline and the rules of civilized warfare, all those marauding bands
of plundering parties should be [placed] under heavy penalty and all
military expeditions even into the mountains should be under the
command of a competent, just and honorable officers.
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Brigadier General Henry Heth scathingly denounced the rangers in a letter
to Governor Letcher on April 2, 1862:
I feel it my duty to inform you of certain facts arising from the
organization of the irregular force known as “rangers,” authorized
by an act of the Legislature of Virginia. The companies of this
organization which have come under my observation are simply
organized bands of robbers and plunderers . . . . Many, especially
the worthless, like the privilege of fighting, as they say, on their
own responsibility, which, interpreted, means roaming over the
country, taking what they want and doing nothing. . . . A guerrilla
force without being closely watched becomes an organized and
licensed band of robbers . . . .28
Heth’s report is an expression of the prevailing orthodox position’s
antipathy for unconventional combatants. State rangers and guerrillas
were characterized as little better than criminals, ineligible for the
privileges the laws of war afford because unconventional combat fell
outside the realm of legally cognizable combat. Despite Heth’s appeal to
Governor Letcher, which was a harbinger of later criticisms of the PRA,
the state rangers’ ranks swelled as men who desired to remain at home
rather than join the conventional army opted to become state rangers—or
guerillas—undermining conventional recruitment efforts on the eve of
major Union offensives anticipated for the spring of 1862.29
The capture of state rangers forced Union commanders to interpret and
expound upon the laws of war, setting the stage for ongoing legal disputes
about the status of unconventional combat and Union occupation policy
between Confederate and Union authorities. Brigadier General Benjamin
F. Kelley’s proclamation to the people of Hampshire county and the Upper
Potomac, dismissing recognition of unconventional combatants in any
form under the laws of war, was a bellwether for prevailing orthodox
position: “[I]f you attempt to carry on a guerrilla warfare against my
troops, by attacking my wagon trains or messengers, or shooting my
guards or pickets, you will be considered as enemies of your country, and
treated accordingly.”30 The nomenclature employed to describe
unconventional combatants as “bushwhackers,” or “marauders”—
Letter from G. W. Berlin esq. to John Letcher (July 4, 1862), in CORRESPONDENCE
JULY-AUGUST 1862, GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA CORRESPONDENCE, VHS.
28. Letter from Henry Heth to John Letcher (April 2, 1862), quoted in
OSBORNE & WEAVER, supra note 15, at 10–11 (emphasis added).
29. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 92.
30. 5 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, supra note 17, at 638–39.
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carrying a criminal connotation—is telling of why Union authorities were
adverse to grant state rangers or partisan rangers prisoners of war status.31
For Governor Letcher, there was no ambiguity. He believed in
regarding state rangers as conventional soldiers and entitling them to the
same privileges under the laws of war. When confronted by news that
Union commanders sought to summarily execute several state rangers,
Governor Letcher wrote the Confederate Secretary of War advocating
retaliation:
[R]egularly commissioned under the law of Virginia in the ranger
service, have been captured by the enemy and it is announced in
their papers that they will be hung. If they shall be executed I think
retaliation should follow promptly. . . . We must let Mr. Lincoln
understand that for every man of this class who shall be executed
we will execute in like manner one of corresponding grade
selected from the prisoners in our custody.32
If Union commanders violated the laws of war by executing soldiers,
the Confederacy retaliation was justified for Governor Letcher to force
recognition of the state rangers’ legal status. Although Governor Letcher
remained a proponent of using unconventional combatants, he relented to
pressure from Confederate army officers in August of 1862, including
General Robert E. Lee, and assigned the state rangers to the Virginia State
Line, Virginia’s independent militia army.33 The Virginia Ranger Act
illuminated partisan rangers’ practical limitations and legal baggage, but
the experiment was enticing enough to Confederate leaders that Congress
passed the PRA in April 1862.
II. THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT
On April 8, 1862, a Confederate congressman from Virginia introduced
a bill by unanimous consent to raise units of partisan rangers.34 Pursuant to
the original bill, partisan rangers would receive a commission of five dollars
for every Union soldier killed, but the Senate Congressional Military
Committee eliminated that section and then presented a substitute bill in
31. Noe, Who Were the Bushwackers?, supra note 4, at 51.
32. Letter from John Letcher to George Randolph (May 27, 1862), quoted in
OSBORNE & WEAVER, supra note 15, at 15.
33. BONEY, supra note 16, at 159.
34. 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF
AMERICA, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 1861–1865, at 193 (1904) [hereinafter JOURNAL
OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS], https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007
686617 [https://perma.cc/6AK7-W6VB].
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which partisan rangers received the same pay, and were subject to the same
regulations, as conventional soldiers.35 The House of Representatives
passed the revised bill on April 19 and the Senate followed suit on April
21.36 The PRA came into effect as part of General Orders No. 30 the War
Adjutant and Inspectors Office issued on April 28, 1862.37 Similar to the
Virginia Ranger Act, partisan ranger officers were granted a commission
to raise and command independent units, and partisan rangers were
expected to coordinate with the army.38 Passed concurrently by Congress,
the Confederate Conscription Act stipulated that applications for partisan
ranger commissions be directed to conventional army generals, not to the
War Department, placing partisan rangers service squarely under the
purview of conventional service.39 Signaling the intention that the PRA
would govern all authorized unconventional combatants, the Conscription
Act explicated that no authority existed outside the PRA to raise units for
guerrilla activity.40
Like the Virginia Ranger Act, the PRA sought to contain and control
unconventional combatants to avoid breaches in the laws of war that
accompanied guerilla violence and to tap into a potentially valuable
military resource. Before the PRA, the War Department had taken the
position that “[g]uerrilla companies are not recognized as part of the
military organization of the Confederate States, and cannot be authorized
by this Department.”41 Witt in Lincoln’s Code underscores the reticence
of General Lee and Confederate President Jefferson Davis to deploy
partisan rangers, noting that Union occupation left Confederate leaders
with little practical choice but to hope to make use of unconventional
combatants through the PRA.42 There may have been doubts, but the
35. WILFRED BUCK YEARNS, THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS 75 (1960); 2
JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 34, at 199. In the revised
bill, partisan rangers, unlike conventional soldiers, could sell captured arms and
munitions to Confederate quartermasters.
36. 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 34, at 279, 285.
37. 1 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. IV, supra note 17, at 1094–95 [hereinafter
PRA].
38. BECKETT, supra note 12, at 10; VSRA, supra note 15, §§ 1, 4; PRA, supra
note 37, § 2. The PRA was vaguer about the duties of partisan rangers than the
Virginia State Ranger Act. The PRA neither explicitly required partisan ranger
units to obey orders of higher ranking army officers nor provide guidance on the
relationship between partisan rangers and the local civilian populace.
39. PRA, supra note 37, § 1.
40. 1 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. IV, supra note 17, at 1098.
41. Id. at 1008.
42. WITT, supra note 1, at 190. Witt notes that Confederate leaders were
reluctant after the American experience with guerrillas in Mexico, exacerbating
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Confederate leadership was willing to back the position that partisan
ranger service was not violative of the laws of war within a year of the
war’s outbreak. Confederate leaders had already embraced the use of
privateers, which may have made them comfortable with asserting the
laws of war and giving partisan rangers the same privileges as
conventional soldiers. Privateers were functionally similar to partisan
rangers because both could keep plunder from the enemy, unlike
conventional combatants.43 Although the PRA organized partisan rangers
as conventional units, the partisan rangers’ operational brief differed
significantly from conventional soldiers. Partisan ranger service was
meant to appeal to those who would have otherwise taken up arms as
guerrillas, not those amenable to conventional service. Colonel John
Imboden’s recruitment advertisement in the Richmond Examiner displays
the expectations of partisan rangers:
My purpose is to wage thermoactive warfare against our brutal
invaders and their domestic allies; to hang about their camp and
shoot down every sentinel, picket, courier and wagon-driver we can
find; to watch opportunities for attacking convoys and forage trains,
and thus rendering the country so unsafe that they will not dare to
move except in large bodies. Our own Virginia traitors—men of the
Pierpoint and Carlisle stamp—will receive our special regards. . . .
It is only men I want—men who will pull the trigger on a Yankee
with as much alacrity as they would on a mad dog; men whose
consciences will not be disturbed at the sight of vandal carcase.44
Conventional soldiers were expected to engage exclusively with enemy
combatants through accepted forms—i.e., a pitched battle in which agents
violence with and against locals and leading to headaches for commanders.
Guerrilla activity during the Mexican-American War forced commanders to
innovate beyond orthodox laws of war to discipline soldiers because military
tribunals were not authorized to adjudicate acts American soldiers committed
against Mexican non-combatants and vice versa. Id. at 122–23.
43. See PRA, supra note 37, § 3. The dispute over recognition of the
Confederate privateer commissions—whether to treat privateers as pirates or
enemy sailors—went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ultimately
recognized the legality of Confederate privateer commissions in 1863, granting
privateers status as combatants rather than pirates under the laws of war. The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); WITT, supra note 1, at 162–63. This outcome
for Confederate privateers likely reinforced Confederate leaders’ confidence that
Union officers would recognize partisan ranger commissions.
44. The Guerrillas in Western Virginia; A Proclamation by Col. Imboden,
RICHMOND EXAMINER, Oct. 26, 1862, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES.
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of the state fought one another for state purposes wherein combatants were
clearly delineated. Partisan rangers targeted non-combat support personnel,
Union sympathizers, and Union soldiers behind enemy lines; creating a
blend of vigilante, police, and conventional military activity. Officially, the
Confederate government outfitted partisan rangers, but in reality, the
majority of supplies, ammunition, weapons, and horses came from captured
Union troops.45 To be differentiated from guerrillas, partisan rangers were
supposed to wear Confederate uniforms. “Uniform,” however, was defined
loosely in practice, so partisan rangers could be readily, and often were,
mistaken for guerillas.46
Through 1862, partisan rangers were held in high esteem amongst the
Confederate leadership. A clerk in the Confederate War Department
attested that President Davis was amenable to subordinating conscription
to encourage partisan ranger recruitment in some areas: “[T]he President
intends suspending the Conscription Act in Western Virginia, for the
purpose, no doubt, of organizing an army of Partisan Rangers in that
direction.”47 Responding to a request for reinforcements by a general
commanding conventional troops in southwestern Virginia, General Lee
suggested, “[I]f you can raise a ranger force, under such competent officers
as you may select and nominate, they will be commissioned by the
President, and every exertion shall be made to arm the rangers as fast as
they are raised.”48 Lee’s order outlines the parameters envisioned for
partisan rangers under the laws of war and in service to the Confederacy.
As a supplement for conventional soldiers under the command of army
officers, partisan rangers were legitimized as an arm of the conventional
military. Because partisan rangers would be utilized for an array of
conventional military services, the laws of war should treat them in the
same way as conventional soldiers. Lee knew his position was legally
novel—evidenced by his attaching of the PRA to his order—cementing
the legal status the Confederate sovereign conferred on the partisan
rangers. A further caveat by Lee—that the commander should personally
45. The PRA permitted partisans to sell back captured military supplies to the
War Department and keep any non-military items they confiscated; this attracted
recruits and may have been a major factor holding partisan commands together.
BRENT NOSWORTHY, THE BLOODY CRUCIBLE OF COURAGE: FIGHTING METHODS
AND COMBAT EXPERIENCE OF THE CIVIL WAR 325 (2003); ROGER U. DELAUTER,
JR., MCNEILL’S RANGERS 19 (1986).
46. John Munson, a partisan ranger in John Mosby’s famed 43rd Battalion
Virginia Cavalry, recalled that “something gray” qualified as a uniform. JOHN W.
MUNSON, REMINISCENCES OF A MOSBY GUERRILLA 25 (1983).
47. J.B. JONES, A REBEL WAR CLERK’S DIARY 173 (1935).
48. 12 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. III, supra note 17, at 899.
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select competent officers—highlights a concern that since partisan rangers
did not operate as conventional units, the competence of their officers was
paramount to prevent partisan rangers from turning into guerrillas. In the
eyes of Lee and other conventional officers, the legal status of partisan
rangers was contingent on practicality. If partisan rangers did not
accomplish their practical purpose by operating as disciplined units in
concert with conventional forces, partisan rangers would slide outside the
realm of legitimacy the PRA created.49
III. UNION RESPONSE TO THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT
The prevailing orthodox position’s disdain for unconventional
combatants informed Union perceptions and treatment of partisan rangers.50
References to unconventional combatants by Union commanders and
officials are loaded with connotations that unconventional combat is
barbaric, obviating Union officers’ duty to treat unconventional combatants
as soldiers under the laws of war. In mid-March of 1862, West Virginia’s
provisional governor, Francis Pierpont, wrote Lincoln to suggest that those
engaged in “guerrilla warfare”—this nomenclature generally captured all
unconventional combatants—be treated as murderers at war’s end.51 Some

49. The New York Times reported on April 24, 1862, that “rebel marauders
and guerrillas are making their appearance, with the green leaves, in quite a
number of the counties of Western Virginia.” Rebel Guerillas in Western Virginia,
reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1862, at 4, https://www.nytimes.com/186
2/04/24/archives/rebel-guerrillas-in-western-virginia.html [https://perma.cc/Y9U
7-6TWM]. Historian Daniel Sutherland asserts that the summer of 1862 marked the
high point of support for guerrillas. Whether or not this is correct, guerrilla attacks
increased in the late spring and early summer of 1862, particularly in Virginia.
Because Union soldiers referred to partisans as guerrillas, however, the true extent of
partisan rangers’ early impact is difficult to gauge. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 4,
at 94.
50. The nature of unconventional warfare engendered fear and hatred in Union
soldiers, and stories of “bushwhacker” atrocities circulated amongst occupying
troops as the war progressed; tales of mutilated corpses infuriated soldiers who
believed they would be fighting rebels on fair terms. Compassion for their erstwhile
countrymen quickly evaporated in Virginia, and Union soldiers blamed civilians
and acted out on their frustration, anger, and fear. One scholar noted that in Virginia,
“Union officers found it increasingly difficult to maintain troop discipline in the
chaotic environment . . . soldiers looking to inflict hardship on local citizens looted
and terrorized towns.” MOUNTCASTLE, supra note 4, at 104–05.
51. Letter from Francis Pierpont to President Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 14,
1862), in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
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Union commanders concluded that since unconventional combatants’
behavior abandoned the standards of civilized white society, unconventional
combatants were not only criminals for breaching laws of war, but also
undeserving of civil and military due process. A Union Assistant Secretary
of War suggested to an officer stationed in Kentucky in May of 1862, “If
guerrillas were shot without challenge as enemies of mankind their bands
would soon disperse, and the assassination of sentinels and teamsters and
other barbarities practiced in irregular warfare would soon cease.”52 That
officer replied a few days later that he had given directions to shoot any
unconventional combatants caught tampering with his supply lines.53
George Crook, commander of a renowned counter-guerrilla unit,
transposed the lessons he had learned fighting Native Americans in the
West to fight unconventional combatants in Virginia, recalling later:
Their [“bushwhackers”] suppression became a military necessity,
as they caused us to detach much of our active service for escorts,
and even then no one was safe. . . . The question was how to get
rid of them. Being fresh from Indian country where I had more or
less experience with that kind of warfare, I set to work organizing
for the task. I selected apt officers, and scattered them through the
country to learn it and all the people in it, and particularly the
bushwhackers, their haunts, etc.54
Native Americans were not practitioners of laws of war orthodoxy. That
tactics used to fight Native Americans were necessary to fight partisan
rangers further evidenced that partisan rangers fell outside the sphere of
laws of war orthodoxy’s protection for captured soldiers and enemy
civilians.
As George Crook advanced through the ranks in the Union army
operating in western Virginia, his attitude contributed to the development
of punitive counter-guerrilla practices that flew in the face of the limiting
spirit of orthodox laws of war by holding civilians accountable for
unconventional activity.55
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d1505
300)).
52. 10 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. II, supra note 17, at 182.
53. Id.
54. GEORGE CROOK, GENERAL GEORGE CROOK: HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY 87
(Martin F. Schmitt ed., 1946).
55. Crook noted in his memoirs that officers “would report that they had
caught so-and-so, but in bringing him in he slipped off a log while crossing a
stream and broke his neck, or that he was killed by an accident discharge of one
of the men’s guns.” Id. A lieutenant colonel in the 3rd Potomac Home Brigade
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The PRA presupposed a legal distinction between partisan rangers and
other unconventional combatants, which elicited disdain from Union
officers. Union General John C. Frémont in April of 1862 reported to
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton that in western Virginia, “a systematic
plan of guerrilla warfare has been arranged and organized . . . under the
sanction of the Confederate Congress and the rebel legislature at
Richmond. Those who have enlisted with the rebels are to be transferred
to these ranger companies, as they are called.”56 Brigadier General Robert
H. Milroy characterized the Union’s rejection of the PRA, stating the
purpose of partisan rangers was to rob, plunder, and devastate western
Virginia based on “blank commissions.”57 The New York Times bemoaned
the burdens of legally distinguishing partisans from other unconventionals:
They have urged all along that bushwhacking and guerrillaism
were legitimate and proper means of war; and that when guerrillas
and bushwhackers were captured, they must be treated by us as
prisoners of war . . . . The hypocrisy of the rebel Government in
this, as in everything else, is now evident . . . . It is time we adopted
the same policy in reference to rebel bushwhackers in Western
Virginia and Missouri.58
The North’s most popular publication, Harper’s Weekly, characterized
unconventional combat as the product of “the four highest crimes in the
warned civilians that “the only way in which they could save their houses from
conflagration was for them to defend their territory against incursions of all lawless
bands of guerrillas.” 12 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. I, supra note 17, at 457.
Major General John Pope took a hard line on guerrillas in Virginia during mid-1862,
issuing General Order No. 7, giving U.S. soldiers license to hold civilian
populations responsible for guerrilla activity. 12 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt.
II, supra note 17, at 51. Lincoln gave Pope’s strict orders his blessing, reiterating
through a warning to Confederates that the property of those supporting guerrillas
would be liable to confiscation, and gave permission to the military governor of
Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, to implement Pope’s orders. Daniel Sutherland,
Abraham Lincoln and the Guerrillas, 42 PROLOGUE MAG. (Q. NAT’L ARCHIVES &
RECS. ADMIN.) 19, 22 (2010), https://www.scribd.com/doc/3 0243096/AbrahamLincoln-and-the-Guerrillas-Prologue-Spring-2010 [https://per ma.cc/8PLKNE7B].
56. 12 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. III, supra note 17, at 55.
57. Id. at 71–72. A few days later, General Kelley wrote Frémont to request a
cavalry force “well acquainted with the public and private roads, mountain passes,
streams, fords, and ferries,” to inhibit the formation of ranger companies. Id. at 62.
58. Public notice, The Rebel Penalty for Bushwacking, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1862, https://www.nytimes.com/1862/09/17/archives/the-rebel-penalty-for-bush
whacking.html [https://perma.cc/E9CD-WNUK] (emphasis added).
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calendar—murder, rape, robbery, and arson.”59 The publication said of
General Frémont, who hanged several unconventional combatants without
trial, “[his] method of treatment in Western Virginia will be the surest.”60
Refusal to recognize partisan rangers was a refusal to accept the
Confederacy’s prerogative to challenge the prevailing orthodox position
on unconventional combatants.61
Desiring a coherent position on partisan rangers, Union General-inChief Henry W. Halleck approached Francis Lieber for legal advice on
how the partisan rangers should be classified and treated under the laws of
war.62 Halleck’s letter requesting Lieber’s insight exudes contempt and
frustration with the PRA:
[R]ebel authorities claim the right to send men, in the garb of
peaceful citizens, to waylay and attack our troops . . . to destroy
property and persons within our lines. They demand that such
persons be treated as ordinary belligerents, and that when captured
they have extended to them the same rights as other prisoners of
war.63

59. HARPER’S WEEKLY, Aug. 30, 1862.
60. GRIMSLEY, supra note 4, at 48–49; HARPER’S WEEKLY, May 17, 1862.
Under Frémont, Union commanders implemented several new counter-guerrilla
tactics in Virginia. Instead of an ad-hoc response to guerrilla and partisan action,
Frémont designated units to specifically engage in counter-guerrillas operations,
instructing his commanders to make “frequent and sudden attacks, by rapid
marches without transportation, by surprises and severity, to destroy all bands
forming and organized in your district, and by terrifying these marauders finally
to uproot the whole system.” 12 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. III, supra note
17, at 164–65. Frémont encouraged and outfitted unionist home guard units,
which often operated in the same legal space as partisan rangers—commissioned
unconventionals—to provide for local defense and antagonize Confederate
sympathizers. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 96.
61. A Maryland Lieutenant Colonel mentioned he had killed men carrying
commissions from the Governor of Virginia authorizing “guerrilla warfare.” 12
WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. I, supra note 17, at 457. That same officer
underscored the barbarity of partisans, noting that the murdered partisan
commander was wearing a Union uniform taken from one of the officer’s soldiers
killed a month before. Id.
62. Halleck disliked the ad hoc status quo of Union policy regarding
guerrillas as general-in-chief, and it troubled him as a regional commander. JOHN
F. MARSZALEK, COMMANDER OF ALL LINCOLN’S ARMIES: A LIFE OF GENERAL
HENRY W. HALLECK 167 (2004).
63. Letter from Major-Gen. H.W. Halleck to Francis Lieber (Aug. 6, 1862),
in FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERILLA PARTIES CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE
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In Halleck’s eyes, unconventional conduct by partisan rangers—i.e.,
attacking soldiers behind lines not in uniform—negated any legal claim
partisan rangers had to be treated as conventional soldiers.
The issue for Halleck was not academic; Confederate authorities
threatened that if partisan rangers were punished as “marauders and
spies”—as Halleck gives the distinct impression he would like to do—
“they will retaliated by executing our prisoners of war in their
possession.”64 Lieber responded with a detailed treatise, Guerilla Parties
Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War.65 In the
treatise, Lieber classified unconventional combatants and explained the
legal standing of each class and its attendant rights under the laws of war.
Lieber extrapolated from recent Euro-American military history to opine
that the laws of war similarly recognized sanctioned partisans as
conventional soldiers.
Heretofore, Lieber noted, the term “partisan” had been “vaguely used”
in orthodox laws of war.66 The proper definition, Lieber argues, pertains
to government authorized partisans, who were simply “bodies detached
from the main army.”67 Similar to militia or levies en masse, sanctioned
partisans were imbued with government authority, even if not engaged in
the activity of conventional units. Guerrillas, on the other hand, “who form
no integrant part of the organized army . . . take up arms and lay them
down at intervals, and carry out petty war (guerilla) chiefly by raids,
extortion, destruction and massacre,” did not enjoy the privileges of
conventional soldiers under the laws of war.68 If captured, “in fair fight
and open warfare,” guerrillas, Lieber reasoned, should be treated “as the
regular partisan is,” until specific crimes are proven; conventional soldiers
or partisan rangers were not subject to a criminal determination when

LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR, at iv (1862), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record
/000624895 [https://perma.cc/ZU6P-AAUS].
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. Jon Fabian Witt points out that Lieber’s classification tacitly rebuked
laws of war orthodoxy by acknowledging the complex realities of 19th century
conflict necessitated classification beyond that orthodox thinking provided. WITT,
supra note 1, at 194.
68. LIEBER, supra note 63, at 18–19. Present throughout Lieber’s
commentary on the distinction between partisans and guerrillas is the assumption
that a lack of organization inexorably leads to violence against prisoners and
civilians. Because guerrillas are not supplied as formal units, Lieber reasons “they
cannot otherwise subsist than by rapine, and almost always degenerate into simple
robbers or brigands.” Id. at 19.
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captured.69 Lieber chided Halleck for failing to recognize a distinction
between guerrillas and partisans, and recommended that partisans be
considered as part of the conventional army:
The partisan leader commands a corps whose object is to injure
the enemy by action separate from that of his own main army; the
partisan acts chiefly upon the enemy’s lines of connection and
communication, and outside of or beyond the lines of operation of
his own army, in the rear and on flanks of the enemy . . . but he is
part and parcel of the army, and, as such, considered entitled to
the privileges of the laws of war . . . .70
Guerrillas’ operations were disorderly and random, but government
control put partisan rangers on a different plane alongside conventional
soldiers according to Lieber. Halleck gave the treatise his stamp of
approval, ordering 5,000 copies be distributed to the Union army.71 A few
months later, Lieber restated the key points from his treatise in Lincoln’s
Code.72 What had begun as a project to clarify the status quo culminated
in Lincoln’s Code, a significant revision of laws of war, by advancing the
concept of military necessity.
Union commanders bristled at the Lincoln Code’s directive to grant
partisan rangers prisoner-of-war status. General Halleck ignored Lieber,
excusing retaliation by Union troops against partisan rangers writ large.
Halleck’s action was contrary to Lincoln’s Code because partisan rangers
did not engage in “legitimate warfare” in October of 1863.73 Halleck
remarked, “It is not surprising that our people get exasperated at such men
and shoot them down when they can. Moreover, men who act in this
69. Id. at 20.
70. Lieber noted of Halleck, “[He] seems to consider partisan troops and
guerrilla troops as the same.” 2 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. III, supra note 17,
at 307; 22 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. II, supra note 17, at 238.
71. FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER: NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERAL 329
(1947).
72. Partisans are “detached from the main body for the purpose of making
inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy” and, if captured, “are entitled to
all the privileges of the prisoner of war,” whereas those acting “without being part
and portion of the organized hostile army . . . with the occasional assumption of
the semblance of peaceful pursuits” are not entitled to prisoners of war status.
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Gen.
Orders no. 100, arts. 81–82, U.S. WAR DEP’T (ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE)
(Apr. 24, 1863), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp [https://perma
.cc/Z953-YAHD].
73. 29 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. II, supra note 17, at 397.
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manner in disguise, and within our lines, have, under the laws of civilized
war, forfeited their lives.”74 In this same message, Halleck named partisan
rangers “guerrillas and robber bands” for refusing to fight in uniforms as
conventional soldiers and for returning to their homes to feign noninvolvement in battle.75 In a similar tone, Brigadier General Edward Wild,
who commanded Union troops in southern Virginia and northern North
Carolina, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of four counties in North
Carolina:
All guerrillas are on a par with pirates, and are to be treated as
such. The fact of their being paid by the State, and being called
‘Partisan Rangers,’ does not help the matter. Neither the Governor
of the State nor Jefferson Davis can legalize such a style of
warfare.76
By the latter half of the war, summary execution of unconventional
combatants—including partisan rangers—was increasingly common.77 In

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 29 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. I, supra note 17, at 917.
77. Brigadier General William H. Powell, operating in the Valley and along
Virginia’s border with West Virginia in the fall of 1864, refers to at least two
instances in which he ordered unconventional troops executed. In retaliation to
the murder of a soldier found with his throat slit, Powell had two “bushwackers”
shot to death on October 4. Nine days later, Powell ordered the execution of one
of John S. Mosby’s partisan rangers for the alleged “cold blooded murder” of two
of his troopers by other Mosby’s rangers; Powell considered the partisan rangers
a “gang of cut throats and robbers.” 43 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. I, supra
note 17, at 508–09. During the summer of 1864 campaign in the Shenandoah
Valley, some Pennsylvania soldiers felt that, because of the disparate ratio
between those Mosby’s men had killed rather than wounded, Mosby had crossed
the line demarcating civilized warfare. Colonel Charles Russell Lowell,
commanding a brigade in Merritt’s division, offered mixed emotions about the
Union’s policies towards guerrillas to his wife on October 5, 1864:
Lieutenant Meigs was shot by a guerrilla, and by order the village of
Dayton and everything for several miles around was burned. I am very
glad my Brigade had no hand in it. Though if it will help end
bushwhacking, I approve it, and I would cheerfully assist in making this
whole Valley a desert from Staunton northward,–for that would have, I
am sure, an important effect on the campaign of the Spring,–but in
partial burnings I see less justice and less propriety. I was sorry enough
the other day that my Brigade should have had a part in the hanging and
shooting of some of Mosby’s men who were taken–I believe that some
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spite of the pains Lieber took to distinguish between partisans and
guerrillas, disagreements persisted.78 Such disagreements rose to the
highest military stratosphere. After Union troops captured some partisan
rangers, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, commander of
Confederate forces around Vicksburg, Mississippi, felt compelled to
explain to his Union counterpart, “these officers and men are as much a
part of the C.S. Army as are any others composing it and as much entitled
to the benefits of the cartel as any of your prisoners whom I now hold.”79
The U.S. Congress even got involved in June 1864 when Ohio
Representative James Garfield introduced “The Bill to Provide for the
More Speedy Punishment of Guerrilla Marauders,” which passed on July
2, 1864.80 The proposed bill licensed departmental commanders and
general officers “to carry into execution all sentences against guerrillas for
robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and for
violation of the laws and customs of wars.”81 In the Senate, Thomas
Henricks proposed an amendment that “the term ‘guerrillas’ therein
contained should not be held to include persons employed in the
authorized service of the enemy,” which ostensibly excluded partisan
ranger commanders’ broad license to mete out punishment.82 Another
Senator floated an amendment that the term “guerillas” did not include
those “in the authorized service” of the Confederacy.83 The Senate rejected
this last condition, and passed the Act with a carve out for partisan rangers,
ostensibly reconciled with Lincoln’s Code.

punishment was deserved–but I hardly think we were within the laws of
war, and any violation of them opens the door for all sorts of barbarity.
CHARLES RUSSELL LOWELL, LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES RUSSELL LOWELL
353 (Edward Emerson ed., 1907).
78. For example, the Daily Richmond Examiner covered a disagreement
between Union and Confederate authorities in late December 1863 over Major
Edgar Burroughs, who had raised a force of partisan rangers in Virginia, but
whom Union authorities held after his capture for allegedly breaking his parole.
DAILY RICHMOND EXAMINER, Dec. 28, 1863.
79. 4 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. II, supra note 17, at 731.
80. 10 THE REBELLION RECORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS, 68–69
(New York, Frank Moore ed., 1869), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.3901507
8222489 [https://perma.cc/63BY-34JW].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 69.
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IV. THE REPEAL OF THE PARTISAN RANGER ACT
A convergence of factors sapped support for the partisan rangers. The
PRA had not eliminated the guerrilla problem by channeling
unconventional combat into a disciplined medium that was useful to the
conventional Confederate army; guerrilla activity persisted throughout the
Confederacy. Conventional army demands for conscripts to replenish the
lost grew louder, prompting revisions to the PRA soon after its passage.84
Initially, the potential conscripts had the choice between partisan ranger
and conventional service. This choice proved appealing to those desirous
of avoiding the conventional battlefield, but Congress amended the PRA
to make conscripts ineligible for partisan ranger service.85
On September 1, 1862, a senator successfully proposed that Congress
amend the PRA so that partisan rangers could only recruit “where the
companies or regiments composing the military force of said district are
filled to the maximum number.”86 Congress continued to debate the
efficacy of partisan rangers and the PRA’s effect on conscription after
84. In late August 1863, General William W. Loring wrote the Confederate
Secretary of War that “many conscripts and volunteers between eighteen and
thirty-five years of age are coming out of Western Virginia and joining the State
Line Partisan Corps and other irregular” rather than his command. Loring
enclosed a request from the major of the First Battalion Virginia Mounted Rifles,
who wished to transfer his entire command to the partisan service. 12 WAR OF
THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. III, supra note 17, at 939–40, https://hdl.handle.net/20
27/coo.31924077730145 [https://perma.cc/V5V3-728A]. Not only did ranger
units detract from army operations, they likely lacked discipline and antagonized
Confederate citizens. Less than a month later, James W. McSherry shared
complaints similar to those Union commanders voiced, stating that “some of
Floyd’s guerrilla bands are through the country, taking [from] the citizens and
stealing every horse they can lay their hands on”; his choice of “guerrillas”
belying respect for the partisan rangers as fellow Confederate soldiers. 19 WAR
OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. II, supra note 17, at 628, https://hdl.handle.net/
2027/coo.31924080772233 [https://perma.cc/JFG3-FVEN]. Major General
Samuel Jones reported in March 1863 that two partisan ranger companies on the
border of Tennessee and Virginia “[had] been doing nothing for a long time.” 25
WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, pt. II, supra note 17, at 671, https://hdl.han
dle.net/2027/coo.31924085376626 [https://perma.cc/E2KY-DXUT]. Those units
that did operate with discipline, military leaders reasoned by late 1863, were of
better use fighting as conventional soldiers. See, e.g., SPENCER C. TUCKER, The 1st
Virginia Partisan Rangers 1862–1863, BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN:
CONFEDERATE COMMANDER IN THE SHENANDOAH 99–102, 110 (2003).
85. YEARNS, supra note 35, at 75.
86. SUTHERLAND, supra note 4, at 101; 2 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE
CONGRESS, supra note 34, at 251.
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these amendments.87 A growing chorus of army officers’ complaints
exacerbated lawmakers’ doubts about the PRA. Echoing these doubts, a
“Report of the Secretary of War” on January 3, 1863, noted:
The policy of organizing corps of Partizan Rangers has not been
approved by experience. The permanency of their engagements
and their consequent inability to disband and reassemble at call,
precludes their usefulness as mere guerrillas. While the
comparative independence of their military relations, and the
peculiar rewards allowed them for captures, induce much license
and many irregularities. They have not unfrequently excited more
odium and done more damage with friends than enemies.88
The Secretary of War went on to discuss the possibility of converting
existing partisan ranger units into conventional service. A letter to the
editor of the Richmond Examiner from “a cavalrymen” shared the
sentiments, declaring “the best interest of the service demands that all
partisan organizations to be broken up . . . . Men are deserting daily and
joining unconventional bands.”89 Although not necessarily a bellwether
for public opinion, this letter suggests that people beyond the Confederate
military and political brass began to question the PRA.
Calls from the highest echelons of the Confederate military in early
1864 sealed the PRA’s fate. Shortly after a joint expedition with a partisan
ranger unit in western Virginia, Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser—
who purportedly had exchanged bitter words with the partisan ranger
commander about the proper role of partisan rangers and horses—wrote
General Lee, condemning partisan ranger service and calling for
disbandment:
Without discipline, order, or organization they roam broadcast
over the country, a band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering,
and doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror
87. 2 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 34, at 251.
88. James A. Seddon, Report of the Secretary of War, CONFEDERATE STS.
AM., WAR DEP’T 12 (Jan. 3, 1863), http://openlibrary.org/books/OL2452748
6M/Report_of_the_Secretary_of_War [https://perma.cc/7DWE-VBXD] (emphasis
added).
89. DAILY RICHMOND EXAMINER, Jan. 26, 1864. In late January 1863, a
representative had presented “the memorial of sundry citizens of Newbern VA,” to
convey the negative public perception of the partisan rangers; the document was
referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. 6 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE
CONGRESS, supra note 34, at 52, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081763827
[https://perma.cc/397Q-H5Q8].
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to the citizens and an injury to the cause. They never fight; can’t
be made to fight. Their leaders are generally brave, but few of the
men are good soldiers, and have engaged in this business for the
sake of gain. The effect upon the service is bad, and I think, if
possible, it should be corrected.90
General Lee and Major General J. E. B. Stuart, Lee’s trusted cavalry
commander, endorsed Rosser’s suggestion in late January of 1864.91 The
Department of War forwarded the Rosser, Stuart, and Lee opinions to the
chairman of the Congressional Military Committee on January 30, 1864.92
Elaborating further on his opinion of partisan rangers in a report to the
Confederate Adjutant and Inspector General in April of 1864, Lee wrote:
“Experience has convinced me that it is almost impossible, under the best
officers even, to have discipline in these bands of partisan rangers, or to
prevent them from becoming an injury instead of a benefit to the
service.”93 The broad condemnation by the military high command
undoubtedly affirmed opinions of many supporters of the prevailing
orthodox position—unconventional combatants were uncontrollable and
outside the bounds of legality, regardless of whether they carried a
government commission or not.
On January 14, 1864, a representative introduced a bill to repeal the
PRA.94 The House of Representatives and the Senate debated the
particulars for a month.95 The final bill, which went into effect on February

90. 33 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, supra note 17, at 1081, https://hdl.han
dle.net/2027/coo.31924077699811 [https://perma.cc/3G2X-3ZJ7]; MILLARD K.
BUSHONG AND DEAN M. BUSHONG, FIGHTIN’ TOM ROSSER, C.S.A 72 (1983).
91. 33 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, supra note 17, at 1082. Stuart took the
orthodox laws of war stance, writing “such organizations [of partisan rangers], as
a rule, are detrimental to the best interests of the army at large.” Less blunt, Lee
surmised: “The evils resulting from their organization [partisan rangers] more
than counterbalance the good they accomplish.” Id. at 1081. As early as March
1863, Stuart had instructed Mosby to eschew the term “partisan ranger” for
“Mosby’s Regulars” so that both the North and South would regard Mosby’s men
as conventional soldiers; Mosby ignored the advice. LEE A. WALLACE, A GUIDE
TO VIRGINIA MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS 1861–1865 39 (1986).
92. 33 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, supra note 17, at 1082.
93. Id. at 1252.
94. 6 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 34, at 628.
95. Eastern state congressmen wanted to repeal the PRA earlier, but western
congressmen deterred them, arguing that because the conscription laws were so
poorly applied in the West, their constituents had little alternative but to join the
partisan ranger units. Id. at 829; 3 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra
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17, 1864, converted mounted units into regular cavalry, united other bands
with existing regular commands, and permitted the Secretary of War to
exempt such units as he deemed proper from the Act’s repeal.96 Only two
partisan ranger units, John S. Mosby’s and John H. McNeill’s commands,
lived up to Confederate leaders’ expectations enough to escape
disbandment.97
CONCLUSION
Unconventional guerrilla violence during the Civil War produced
uniquely challenging legal quandaries about Confederate sovereignty and
the Union military jurisdiction, and influenced Union treatment of
civilians, creating questions about the boundaries of the laws of war. The
embarrassment resulting from the PRA, between and among Union
soldiers and Confederates, forced engagement with laws of war
orthodoxy. The Confederacy ultimately reverted to the orthodoxy by
repealing the PRA because the partisan ranger experiment had not born
fruit, vindicating the orthodox-informed position that promoting

note 34, at 791, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433081763850 [https://per
ma.cc/Z4Q7-3UGD]; YEARNS, supra note 35, at 75.
96. YEARNS, supra note 35, at 75; 6 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE
CONGRESS, supra note 34, at 828–29.
97. Mosby’s 43rd Battalion Virginia Cavalry stands apart in the accolades
Confederate military leaders received as the prototypical partisan ranger for its
professionalism and success, operating independently and with conventional
units. General J.E.B. Stuart stated that Mosby’s rangers were “the only efficient
band of rangers [he knew] of.” 33 WAR OF THE REBELLION, ser. I, supra note 17,
at 1082. Although guerrillas and other partisan rangers promoted lawlessness,
Mosby’s rangers sought to uphold the tenants of military discipline and civil
order, as laws of war orthodoxy expected. In the absence of local government and
amid the chaos the presence of campaigning armies created, Mosby effectively
acted as the local government, maintaining peace and stability. A Mosby
subordinate, Major John Scott, attests:
[I]t is only natural that this district of country [Northern Virginia] should
be infested by deserters, blockade-runners, and other disreputable
characters, as well as by horse-thieves and cattle-lifters. To meet this
evil, he [Mosby] has authorized the arrest of all soldiers not having
regular leaves of absence, and awards their horses as prizes to their
captors.
Scott later asserted that, because of the conduct of his men, Mosby won “a deep
hold on the confidence and affection of the people of Northern Virginia.” JOHN
SCOTT, PARTISAN LIFE WITH COL. JOHN MOSBY 399 (London, Sampson Low, Son
& Marston 1867).
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unconventional units would only promote inappropriate violence amongst
combatants and civilians. Although its field commanders maintained a
strictly orthodox view of partisan rangers, the Lincoln administration
stepped away from orthodoxy by adopting Lincoln’s Code. The PRA’s
failure highlights the Union leadership’s success with Lincoln’s Code and
its import as a framework to reconcile those themes. Against this
backdrop, the PRA’s enactment and repeal adds to the understanding of
the dynamic mosaic of competing legal positions during the Civil War.

